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CHINA AND THE WORLD: 
INDEPENDENCE v DEPENDENCE 
Introduction 
China's ability to astonish the foreign observer seems 
to be one constant factor In this society of rapid change. 
In the 1950s the People's Republic (PRC) pursued a policy 
of 'lean to orfe side' and made 'learn from the Soviet Union' 
the watchworc;I of domestic as well as foreign policy. In the 
mid-1960s Mao Zedong's so-called Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution unleashed anti-foreign violence against 'British 
Imperialism' and 'Soviet revisionism' alike, with physical as 
well as rhetorical assaults. In the late 1970s Deng Xlaoping 
called for a global united front against 'socialist imperialism' 
to advanc·e the common strategic concern or West Europe, 
China, Japan and the United States against ~oviet 
expansionism. Now In the 1980s China's leaders explicitly 
deny that alignment, much less alliance, with any foreign 
power Is possible, Instead proclaiming a policy or inde-
pendence and opposition to superpower hegemony. 
It is small wonder that doubts arise abroad over the 
reliability and durability or pledges that the present 'open 
door' for foreign trade and Investment will not be closed In 
the future. Indeed the more Deng and his associates Insist 
that thes~ avenues or Involvement In the International 
economic system will continue 'for at least fifty years', the 
more observers question the degree to which he ls tryinf to 
convince domestic opponents as well as foreign sceptics. 
It Is not only the first three decades or extreme 
swings In PRC foreign policy which caution against taking 
such projections at race value. Deng himself is 81. His 
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proteges, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, respectively head 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the government, 
may not work in harness once he leaves the scene. 
Alternatively, they may face power struggles and policy 
disputes from opponents presently cowed by Deng's 
formidable fasf)ionlng of coalitions and manlp.ulatlon of 
factions. In either case the 'open door' could become subject 
to vigorous challenge, either as a political ploy against the 
established leadership or as a legitimate target of attack by 
those concerne.d · with China's sense of identity and 
Independence. 
It is no accident that the overwhelming preponderance 
of foreign i.nvestment in the PRC comes from overseas 
Chinese, while Japanese, American and European capital 
remains larg~ly in a 'wait and see' holding pattern. 2 
Moreover much capital from these latter sources is in 
non-producing, quick return ventures such as hotel and 
tourist facilities. Overseas Chinese can be motivated by 
patriotism as well as profitability, with an additional side 
payment in some instances going to their mainland relatives, 
whether in status, privileges, or monetary benefits. 3 But 
other sources of private capital must calculate in standard 
business terms, balancing the potential gains and risks or 
Investing In China against those present elsewhere. Seen 
from this perspective it Is understandable that, except for 
offshore oil entrepreneurs who are accustomed to high-cost, 
high-risk ventures, relatively few investments of any real 
magnitude have as yet emerged from abroad. 
To be sure, foreign investors have also been deterred 
by the inadequate legislation defining rights, privileges, 
taxes, and protection, much of which only emerged in 
1983-84. Implementation of the new laws also requires a 
testing period. In addition, the full Impact of China's 
economic reforms, the reshuffling and reduction of bureau-
cratic procedures, and the proper gestation of special 
economic zones, fourteen coastal city trading areas, and 
specially designated inner regions necessarily delays the 
massive infusion of foreign capital. 4 
But beyond these more mundane problems, the basic 
question plaguing many entrepreneurs otherwise attracted 
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by the prospect of a market embracing one billion people 
has remained: will present policy last sufficiently long to 
make It worth the effort of prolonged negotiations with 
delayed and uncertain payback? In 1986 China enters its 
Seventh Five Year Plan. This is an appropriate time to 
attempt an answer to this question and to assess the degree 
of regime commitment to dependence on the world economy, 
euphemistically subsumed under the 'open door' rubric. To 
what extent is Deng's rhetoric echoed by others? Do the 
political implications of dependence accord with nationalistic 
assertions of independence? How far has economic practice 
moved away from tviao Zedong's Insistence on 'self-reliance'? 
In short, does the available evidence in word and deed 
justify forecasting either durability for present policy or 
alternatively 'its likely demise once Deng leaves the scene? 
Admittedly, the · foreign forecasting of Chinese political 
behaviour has : a highly uneven record, whether in antici-
pation of the Sino-Soviet break, the Cultural Revolution, ·or 
the rapp.rochement with .Washington. It is small comfort to 
note that Chinese whose political, and at times physical, 
lives depended on it also failed to foresee these and other 
major developments. The fact remains that we are In _ a 
somewhat hazardous u ndertaklng when attempting · 
projections beyond the near future of a few years. 
Yet the effort is not wholly without reason. Historical 
recall Illuminates how a century-old debate over self-
reliance versus dependence provides a long-term per-
spective against which to compare the relatively short-term 
period of the 'open door' policy. This period wlll then be 
assessed both from the theoretical writings of Chinese 
economists and by the practical steps taken to implement 
policy. Finally a forecast will be made of what Is probable, 
as against what Is possible, In China's foreign economic 
relations. This overview from past and present to the 
future may have greater plausibility than would result from 
either a .·simple acceptance of regime rhetoric as all-
determining or Its outright rejection because of the 
aforementioned poiicy oscillations. 
0 ne conceptual clarification is necessary. The Western 
notion of dependencia defines Third World countries as 
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trapped in the economic exchange with industrialised 
countries and in the international monetary bind of heavy 
indebtedness and high interest rates without reliable means 
of repayment. This goes far beyond anything that China 
has experienced or is likely to encounter. Instead, 
dependence, both in Chinese writings and herein, is 
qualitative rather than quantitative, so that foreign 
involvement Is critical to the accomplishment of stated goals 
because the impact on China's economic growth would be so 
severe if, ·a·s Mos.cow did In 1960, the foreigner should 
terminate the relationship. 
The Historic Dilemma 
From the Opium War of 1839-41 to the end of World 
War II spans .'a century of shame and humiliation', so named 
by both Nationalist and Communist writers. The term 
connotes a wide range of foreign depredations, such as the 
granting of extraterritoriality, spheres or influence, 
territorial annexation, enemy defeat in war, and allied 
betrayal in victory. Whether in Sun Yat-sen's terms China 
faced 'being carved up like a melon' or In Mao Ze_dong's 
conceptualisation China became 'a semi-colony', the basic 
question of survival as a country and as a society · faced 
each succeeding regime down to and Including the People's 
Republic established In 1949. 
These successive experiences triggered a recurring 
debate between the proponents of inward versus outward 
oriented ways to cope with the omnipresent foreign threat. 
The nativists opposed relying on outside powers to defend 
China through conventional alliances or to strengthen China 
through helping it to develop, because such dependence 
inevitably would benefit the foreigner, not China. 
Moreover, it ultimately would destroy traditional societal 
values which had preserved the Middle Kingdom identity 
through several millenia. Against this point of view was 
the argument for 'using barbarian against barbarian' while 
opening up to the world so as to combine 'Chinese spirit, 
foreign way'. 
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After a brief heyday the outward looking reformers 
lost out to the inner oriented conservatives, dramatically 
manifest in the anti-foreign actions of the Boxers. But the 
dilemma of having to choose between self-reliance with its 
attendant weakness, 'and dependence with the accompanying 
foreign influence, if not dominance, persisted. Sinocentrism 
was the heritage of 3,000 years of continuous civilisation 
that saw itself as surviving because it was superior to all 
others. The values and mores that, at least in idealised 
form, epitomised this superiority seemed antithetical tp and 
threatened by those Inherent in foreign capitalism. Chiang 
Kai-shek's China Destiny put It most extremely In blaming 
the 'unequal treaties' for having 'completely destroyed our 
nation hood, .and our sense of honor and shame was lost ••• 
The traditional structure of the family, the village, · and the 
community was disrupted. The virtue of mutual help was 
replaced by c~nipetltlon and jealousy •15 
To compound the dilemma, modern nationalism emerged 
in China with a strong anti-foreign component in reaction to 
the blatant imperialism of the nineteenth century and the 
more veiled legalistic twentieth century variety. 6 China's 
perceived · sell-out at the 1919 Paris Conference ·led to a 
wave of public opposition, subsequently known as the May 
Fourth Movement, which initiated a decade of boycotts, 
strikes and demonstrations specifically aimed at British, 
Japanese, and other foreign concessions. Yet there was no 
way that Republican China could amass the capital for 
investment, acquire the weapons for defence, or confront 
anbther power without foreign help. 
The communist avowal of 'proletarian internationalism' 
did not end the nationalistic striving for a unique Chinese 
Identity with its Implicit anti-foreign thrust. Thus Anna 
Louise Strong learned In post-war Yan'an that Mao Zedong 
had 'created a Chinese Marxism' because until then Marxism 
had been a European phenomenon. 7 Zhou Enlal and his 
colleagues told American diplomats that while being Marxist 
meant leaning to one side, It did not mean agreeing with all 
Soviet policy. Moreover, how far one leaned would depend 
on US behaviour. 8 
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To be sure, If Stalin required such sentiments to be 
muted in order to gain his military support against a 
perceived American threat and his economic assistance to 
rebuild a shattered China, Peking could accommodate him. 
If Khrushchev could be cajoled into returning concessions 
in Xinjiang and the north-east by a 'learn froni the Soviet 
Union' campaign, that too could be arranged. · And if 
winning nuclear weapons assistance from Moscow was facil-
itated by calling upon the 'socialist camp' to recognise that 
there had to be a single head and declaring that 'East Wind 
prevails over West Wind' on the basis of Sputnik, Mao could 
so oblige. 9 
However, in 1958, Mao 'decided to make self-reliance 
our major policy and striving for foreign aid a secondary 
aim 1 • 10 W.hether it was a question of domestic economic 
policy on communes and the Great Leap Forward or of 
foreign policy In testing the US-Chiang tie through 
bombardment of Quemoy, he would no longer bow to the 
dictates of dependence on the Soviet Union. Not only was 
Mao determined to do things his way but he was willing to 
provoke the withdrawal of all Soviet aid, human, financial 
and material, In order to pursue an Independent course. 
Much research remains to be done on the Inner 
workings of the Sino-Soviet relationship during the 1950s. 
However there are suggestive similarities in the experience 
of Peking with Moscow, at least as articulated by Mao in his · 
then unpublished statements, and the experience of Peking 
with various foreign powers a century or so earlier. For 
example, Mao suspected Khrushchev of selling out to 
Eisenhower on Taiwan during the celebrated 1959 Camp 
David summit, which was followed by Moscow's ' public 
neutrality after Sino-Indian border clashes that autumn. 
This recalls Li Hongzhang's failure to cement Russian 
support against Japan sufficiently to preclude their 
collusion in carving up north-east China during the first 
decade of this century. 
Yet galling as were these experiences, real or 
perceived, they raised the same dilemma as the previous 
century: how could China overcome military and economic 
weakness without foreign assistance? On the other hand, 
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what was the price to be paid - in societal as well as in 
political and economic terms - for continued dependence? 
Mao resolved the dilemma by challenging Khrushchev to the 
near dissolution of the alliance in 1960. 
But this was only a harbinger of the more extreme 
isolationist line or 'self-reliance' that was to explode in 
anti-foreign behaviour during the Cultural Revolution. Not 
only in Peking but around China's borders and in PRC 
embassies abroad, Red Guards shouted and stormed their 
way in open defiance of diplomatic relations. As they 
ransacked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking, one 
official who cautioned against dumping secret files out the 
window evoked the rejoinder, 'What's so special about 
secrets anyway?'ll 
Followi.ng the burning of the British Chancery in 
August 1967, Zhou Enlai personally apologised to London 
and limited further anti-foreign violence. On the southern 
border, secret negotiations between the People's Liberation 
Army (PLA) and the British military command agreed on 
mutual measures to stop Canton militants seeking to infil-
trate Hong Kong for 'the liberation of our brothers and 
sisters from the British fascists'. By 1968 the worst had 
passed. Mao finally gave in to the PLA. which considered 
that China was threatened by anarchy and civil war. Martial 
law packed the Red Guards off to the countryside, to 
prison, and In some Instances, to execution. 
Although China returned its ambassadors to embassies 
whence they had been totally withdrawn except for Cairo, 
the tension between nativist isolationists and foreign 
dependence modernisers remained. After a spurt of 
contracts for the importation of complete plants and sets of 
equipment in the early 1970s, the subsequently dubbed 
'Gang or Four' attacked the selling of China's resources, 
mainly coal and oil, for the benefit or foreign capitalists, 
mainly Japanese. They also attacked Zhou Enlai through 
thinly veiled historical allegories that accused him of 
betraying Mao as well as Chlna.12 
Thus an American world affairs delegation discovered 
'self-reliance' to be the insistent watchword during Its visit 
to China In late 1975. 13 A high official assured his 
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astonished audience that Chine 'will never seek to make 
money from tourism because we will view foreign visitors es 
our guests'. Meoist aphorisms, such es 'the world Is In 
turmoil, th.e situation is excellent', keynoted the monologue 
edvenced by the Chinese side, which assiduously avoided 
engaging the prestigious Americans in e retlonel exchange 
end discussion of world effeirs end Chine's relationship 
thereto. 
But within e year Meo died end the 'Geng of Four' fell. 
Momentous political developments were already under wey 
that would restore Deng Xiaoping to power with both 
domestic end foreign pollci~s aimed at resolving, once and 
for all, the debate between self-reliance and dependence in 
favour of the latter. 
The 'Open Door' Policy 
The American Secretary of State, John Hay, could 
never have imagined that his doctrine of 'the open door' for 
China would re-emerge decades later in a fresh guise; much 
less that it would become the watchword for Chinese foreign 
policy. His goal wes to win agreement from the either 
imperialist powers that no spheres of Influence would 
exclude American cepltel from Chine. Despite his having 
proclaimed success, nothing changed. Various powers 
preserved their existing domains of dominance end, in the 
case of Russia end Jepen, further consolidated them 
subsequently in north-east China by secret egreement. 14 
In 1963, Assistant Secretary of State for the Fer East, 
Roger Hllsmen, resurrected the term with e new twist. In 
the first major official address on US China policy sl.nce the 
'containment' days of John Foster Dulles, Hllsmen celled 
attention to Washington's posture of 'firmness with 
flexibility', pledging that 'we ere determined to keep the 
door open' to change In Peking so that e subsequent 
generation of leadership might find normelisetion of relations 
with the · US both prudent end proflteble.15 
It remained for Deng Xleoping, however, to turn Hey 
on his heed, promoting the 'open door' et home end abroad 
as essential to China's deter mi nation to develop a modern 
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economy and a rising standard of living through the 
importation of foreign capital, technology, and advice. In a 
remarkable r _evlsion of history as ritualistically reiterated 
for nearly a century, Deng directly addressed inward 
versus outward oriented policy. Speaking In October 1984 
to the Central Advisory Commission, a prestigious If 
relatively poweriess body of superannuated party veterans, 
he declared:. 
Any country that closes Its door to the outside 
world cannot achieve progress. We underwent 
this bitter experience and so did our forefathers. 
The Ming Dynasty's Yongle emperor would be 
considered a ·n 'open' emperor In dispatchl.ng Zheng 
He to embark on an ocean voyage to the West. 
After the emperor died the Ming Dynasty grad-
ually declined and China was Invaded by 
foreigners. Kangxl and Qlanlong of the Qing 
Dynas.iy could not be called ' open' emperors. 
China closed the country to International Inter-
course .for more than three centuries from tb.e 
middle -of -thE: Ming Dynasty to the Opium War, or 
for nearly two centuries from emperors Kangxl 
and Qlanlong. Hence the country became 
Impoverished, backward, and lgnorant. 16 
( Emphasis added] 
Deng's definition of when and why the Middle Kingdom 
decayed to the point of collapse contrasted sharply with the 
standard litany of blame levied on foreign Imperialism by 
commu nlst and non-commu nlst alike. Then In another 
reversal of rhetoric he moved to the recent past. 'In the 
First Five Year Plan after the fou ndlng of the People's 
Republic of China, we opened the country to the outside 
world but only to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
Later on, we closed the door and we did not make any 
progress.' 
This capsule history of the 1950s is striking in two 
regards. First, Deng made no mention of the United States' 
embargo on trade with China that not only excluded all 
American commerce but also Interfered drastically with third 
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country trade. Instead he asserted that it was China which 
had 'opened ••• only to the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe'. Deng's failure to recount the facts contr·asted with 
his assertion in 1978 that 'while Comrade Mao was still 
living • • • we wanted to develop economic a'nd trade 
relations with certain capitalist countries and even to 
absorb foreign capital and undertake joint ventures. 
But ••• at t.he time an embargo was being imposed on 
China .• 17 His earlier statement pointedly had sought to 
implicate Mao in Deng's newly emerging policy on joint 
ventures, while not claiming the chairman's explfcit 
endorsement. Equally Interesting Is his fallure to recall 
how Stalin forced Sino-Soviet joint ventures on the PRC in 
1950 and how Khrushchev ended them in 1954 as a gesture 
of better relations .18 
This raises a second aspect of the 1984 speech. By 
omitting any reference to the Soviet withdrawal of all 
advisers an.d technical assistance in 1960, Deng llfted the 
onus from Khrushchev for bringing to a sudden and costly 
end a decad~ of economic dependence. Thus his handling 
of past American and Soviet policy signalled a readiness to 
let bygones be bygone while self-critically blaming Peking 
for these externally Imposed obstacles to modernisation. 
Deng's elliptical allusion to China having 'closed the door' In 
the 1960s presumably referred to the Cultural Revolution, 
paralleling his 1978 accusation that 'the Gang or Four ••• 
sealed China off from the outside world'. 
Having rewritten the previously accepted Chinese 
version or these events, Deng then took unnamed 
opponents directly to task: 
We must open to the outside world and the open 
policy will not hurt us ••• Some or our comrades 
are afraid that evil practices may be introduced 
in the country. They are most worried about 
whether we will become capitallst. Perhaps, some 
or our veteran comrades have this worry. They 
are afraid or seeing capitalism suddenly looming 
up after having worked all their lives for 
socialism and communism, and they cannot stand 
such a sight .• 
No, nothing will be affected. It may bring some 
negative (actors. But It will not be difficult to 
overcome such factors If we are aware of them. If 
we closed the country to international Inter-
course, even another 50 years would definitely 
make it impossible to come close t~ the level of 
the economically developed countries. When we are 
close to the level of the economically developed 
countries wlfh an annual Income of seve.ral 
thousand doltars per capita, a new bourgeois 
class will not emerge because all the basic m·eans 
will still be ow.ned by the sta.te and the 
publlc.[Emphasls added) 
11 
Deng did not move to so clear and uncompromising a 
statement .of his views until he had prepared the political 
ground by : purging the top party ranks of vestigial Maolst 
'leftist' Influences and laying the basis for a coalition of 
vested ihterests whose potential future rested with the new 
policy of dependence. Significantly, his Selected Works, 
1975-1982, Issued with great fanfare In 1983, contained 
relatively little on foreign policy, foreign trade, and foreign 
participation In the vaunted 'four modernlsatlons1.19 
By late 1984, however, Deng's position was secure 
enough for him to state the case without reservation. His 
speech won mass distribution throughout the country via 
the media and separate publication on 31 December 1984, 
thereby setting the tone for the new year. Moreover, It 
anticipated formulation of the Seventh Five Year Plan In 
1985-86, pre-empting any attempt to resurrect the hoary 
myths of foreign domination and foreign corruption as a 
counter to. the economic advantages of foreign dependence. 
It is in this regard that his rewriting of standard history 
as promulgated In China deserves special attention. 
The Politics of Dependence 
Yet after more than a century of recurring debate 
over foreign dependence and Its impact on Chinese society, 
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marked by intermittent outbursts of xenophobic behaviour, 
one cannot assume that simply because Mao ls dead and 
Deng ls in charge, the debate has ended. For one thing, a 
population as large and varied as China does not change 
attitudes on so emotional an issue overnlght. 2·0 Moreover 
not all signals ·rrom the centre have been uniform and 
consistent on the matter since Mao's death. 
During the 'spiritual pollution' campaign of 1983-84, for 
example, attacks on 'bourgeois corruption' fell short of 
nativlst isolationism but their implication or contamination 
resulting from foreign contact inhibited relations between 
Chinese and 'foreign exp.erts' in various ways. 21 One 
American reported being treated 'as though I had hetpes of 
the breath'. In mid-1984 another was accused by a young 
Chinese in his· unit of being a 'foreign spy, otherwise why 
would you be . here?122 Such instances are neither universal 
nor constant as numerous contrary accounts testify. 
However their occurrence illustrates the need for con-
sistency in policy over time to achieve complete acceptance 
or the 'open door' in all or its manifestations. 
Throughout 1984, acknowledgement of resistance, if 
not open opposition, continued to crop up ln writings 
advocating Den g's programme. Th us one article noted: 'For 
a long time, our country has been closed off and sealed in 
and therefore we lack an understanding of new international 
situations. Since implementing the open policy, many 
comrades still have an insufficient understanding of the 
strategic ·significance of introducing foreign funds. 123 
Against this view the writer argued: 'An important trend 
in the development of a world economy since World War II ls 
that production and capital have become increasingly 
internationalised and the degree of interdependence among 
countries has increased. Therefore implementing an 
economy open to foreign cou ntrles and developing foreign 
economic and trade relations are state policies common to all 
countries at present.' 
Another author addressed the question of joint 
ventures, refuting various points of contention. 'Some 
people' say these are 'foreign enterprises' but this is wrong 
because they exist under China's legal jurisdiction. 24 'Some' 
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call them 'capitalist enterprises' but there are no private 
Investors on the PRC side. Others deny that joint 
ventures can operate in a planned economy, but the author 
considered ttiat the mixture of market and plan facilitated 
them. As a- final riposte to those who feat that joint 
ventures threaten the eventual introduction of communism, 
he responded: 'We believe international co-operation will 
exist for a long time ••• Arter socialism Is bu llt ·and when 
the time comes to transfer to communism, we will still need 
the open dooi: policy. All countries and nationalities 
depend on eac.h other' in the world market. 
Foreign loans raise a host of contentious issues, some 
economic and some historical. As one writer noted, 'At the 
mention of foreign loans some comrades tend to evince 
concern ov·er the heavy burden Imposed by debts.•25 More 
seriously, perhaps, 'There are other comrades who fear that 
the use of large amounts of borrowed money from foreign 
governments might put the nation under the con.trol of 
foreign P<?wers as It was in the old days.' He cited the 
'gunboat policy to break open the door which closed old 
China from the outside world', and recalled how 'the 
Western capitalist countries pressured those In power at the 
time Into signing a series of unequal treaties by which they 
proceeded to export Into China their surplus capital In 
order to gain control of the economic lifeline of the old 
China'. However, 'they are in essence different from the 
use of foreign capital for the socialist projects of economic 
construction In which we are now engaged ••• Today ours 
is an entirely independent sovereign state.' 
It is Impossible to infer from such scattered references 
what degree of opposition exists, much less where It Is 
located and with what political potential. Suffice to say 
that the repeated counterarguments to plausible attacks 
suggest continued resistance to various aspects of the 'open 
door', and In particular to foreign loans and joint ventures. 
Further, where such criticism ls not specifically cited, the 
vigour with which Deng's programme is promoted may reflect 
a felt need to persuade a doubtful audience. Thus a 
lengthy discussion of China's electronics industry began 
with the assertion: 
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In the world's new technological revolution, the 
rapid development of electronics technology Is 
bringing with It a new and developing Industry 
and is vigorously making a run at the electronics 
Industry of all nations ••• The field of inter-
national trade is the first to be affected by this; 
thus we must give this problem our full attention, 
resolutely Implement the CPC Central Committee 
open door policy, place ourselves in the inter-
national division of labour of the electronics 
Industry, closely Integrate the development of our 
own '?lectronlcs industry with International trade, 
use new technical achievements, vigorously 
develop the electronics industry, and promote 
develop.ment of the 'four modernisations'. 26 
[ Emp:Jiasls added 1 
The author compared the high Import rates for electronics 
of the United States, West Germany and Japan with the low 
rate for C.hina, concluding: 
This ••• is mainly caused by the country being 
closed off to International intercourse and cut off 
from the world for a long time. Premier Zhou 
Enlal criticised the 'traditional conservatism' of the 
electronics Industry. It was deeply affected by 
'leftist' ideology and It stopped the entry of 
Imports in the name of 'self-reliance', 'national 
prod.uctlon', and 'safeguarding the national 
Industry'. 
However, the recent designation of fourteen coasti;tl ports 
for export production 'was a new turning point in the 
h I story of C h I na's foreign economic and trade relations and 
terminated China's long-standing seclusion. [Emphasis 
added] 
This analysis proceeded to recall an old saying: 'China 
has a large population, vast land and large market so 
we do not have to rely on the International market.' But 
this was 'small-scale peasant economic Ideology'. Celling for 
a 'Silicon Valley-style base In coastal ports registered for 
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export', the writer concluded, 'We must actively seek 
Investment from abroad for jointly run enterprises ••• 
China not only needs to import foreign capital but also must 
go abroad to develop joint venture trade ••• By paying 
attention to developing the markets. of the Third World, we 
can shake off the competition of the developed nations for 
our electronics products.' 
The i'.!Jl .plied sideswipe at 'self-reliance' goes further 
than most articles which at least pay lip-service to this as 
an ultimate goal, albeit with so slight a passing reference 
as to suggest that it is more rhetorical than real. An 
apparent exception, notable in its greater attention to the 
subject, declared': 'We must never again close the country 
to International Intercourse and oppose the import of foreign 
advanced technology, upholding the principle of starting 
everything from the beginning. But we should definitely 
guard again.st one tendency, namely, worshipping and 
having blind faith in things foreign, underestimating our 
own capabilities and giving up the path of self-
development. 127 He further asserted that 'We should take 
the Initiative to Introduce technology to enhance our own 
capability of technological innovation. Such a practice 
conforms with the principle of self-reliance.' He then cited 
the example of Japan which 'spent $5.8 billion to import a 
total of 26,000 technical Items In twenty-six years, 1950 to 
1975 ••• There ls much In the Japanese experience that we 
can make use of.' Thus his final analysis advanced a 
notable case of dependence as the best means for 
development. 
The 'Open Door' In Practice 
Advocacy and argumentation alone do not necessarily 
guarantee survival of the'open door', therefore political 
developments deserve attention In assessing Its durability. 
First and foremost, . the long heralded review of CCP 
membership files In order to root out 'leftists, smashers, 
and power grabbers' offers a powerful means of either 
Inducing compliance or eliminating opposition. Secondly, 
the steady expansion of foreign trade, joint ventures, and 
16 
co-operative enterprises involving foreign investment and 
technical advice creates new vested Interests for 
dependence. as against self-reliance. 
Export Commodity Production Bases (ECPB), first tried 
in the early 1970s, expanded rapidly by the early 1980s. 28 
Concentrated in the coastal areas, they now comprise 100 
single-commodity agricultural units, 94 specialised .industrial 
bases (factories and mines), 30 comprehensive production 
bases, an·d 821 processing bases, in addition to 130 joint 
enterprises linking government industrial or agricultural 
departments with foreign trade corporations. Altogether 
the ECPBs ·earned an esti!Jlated 22 per cent of t°he total 
foreign exchange received in 1981, and 30 per cent in 1982, 
with three-fourths coming from the comprehensive 
production bases located in fourteen provinces. 
This focus on the coastal area also characterised the 
four highly· touted Special Economic Zones (SEZ), although 
their success has yet to be determined. 29 More Important, 
In early 1984 fourteen coastal cities and Hainan were opened 
up to foreign investment with privileges similar to but 
different from the SEZs. Following protests from the 
Interior, the regime named another thirty cities, twenty-
four of which were inland, with special foreign exchange 
access and direct negotiations with foreign investors to be 
approved by Peking without provincial level intervention. 30 
Thus every province now has at least one city, often the 
capital, able to contract joint ventures or wholly foreign-
owned enterprises, entirely on its own within specified 
limits which, in some cases, can reach $30 million. In 
mid-1985, restrictions on the use of foreign exchange 
postponed implementation of these programmes. However 
they remain on the books as targets for tomorrow, if not 
today. 
While many of these locations will be producing for the 
domestic mark et, the political importance of their joining the 
SEZs and coastal cities In competing for foreign Investment 
and trade should not be underestimated. The image of 
foreign capitalism profiting from cheap labour in specially 
favoured enclaves along China's seaboard hearkened back 
suggestively to the 'century of shame and humiliation', 
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although extra-territoriality and foreign gunboats no longer 
violate Chinese sovereignty. This negative Image could be 
readily attacked by the remaining areas where unemployment 
and productivity would fall far behind. But by greatly 
expanding the opportunity to compete for foreign Invest-
ment, even though experience, Infrastructure and )ocatlon 
still significantly advantage coastal cities, Deng has laid the 
basis for a nation-wide network to support the 'open door' 
against any nativlst opposition. The extent of this network 
Is suggested by the Identification of more than 3,000 
projects ap.proved for foreign Investment, ranging from 
agricultural pi;oductlon and electronics to textiles and 
transporta"tlon. :n · 
In addlti<?n, the web of foreign involvement in economic 
modernisation enmeshes numerous activities. Between 1979 
and 1985, $17.3 billion in foreign funds had entered 
China, of which _4 billion was in direct Investment tied to 
more than 900 joint ventures, 2,000 co-operative ventures, 
31 joint development enterprises, 7 4 foreign-owned enter-
prises and 1,300 compensation trade projects. 32 In 1984 
alone, moi:-e thlin 700 new joint ventures linked Chinese and 
foreign in vestment, 3. 5 times the total number previously 
contracted for and 2.2 times the earlier total investment. 
During the first half of 1985, 687 joint venture contracts 
were signed, quadruple the same period the previous year. 
More than $3 billion was committed, of which half was 
already in use by mid-year, and of this latter portion, 
$820 million came through loans from international govern-
mental organisatfons and foreign governments. 33 Although 
the greater part of such funds and activity continued to 
come from Hong Kong and overseas Chinese, the proportion 
of Japanese and other foreign Involvement increased in 1984 
and is expected to accelerate in growth as new legislation 
provides an improved environment. 
In this regard It ls worth noting that twenty-three 
Japanese banks and five insurance companies have estab-
lished fifty representative offices in China while the Bank 
of China has business relations with fifty-six Japanese 
banks.34 Durt"ng 1979-84, Tokyo granted $1.2 billion In low 
interest loans while the Export-Import Bank of Japan 
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provided $1.68 billion for a total of nearly $2.9 billion. The 
Japanese government has agreed to another $1.9 billion loan 
for 1985-90, the Export-Import Bank is committed to an 
additional $2.32 billion, and a syndicate of sixty-seven 
Japanese banks is offering another $2 billion. ·The total of 
more than $6 billion in potential Japanese loans exceeds 
China's total debt as of mid-1985 by $2 billion, although It 
falls well within -the safe range of 20 per cent of annual 
foreign exchange earnings anticipated during the Seventh 
Five Year Plan. 
This " linkage of loans, investment, industrial product-
ivity, technology transfer f\nd foreign trade is part of an 
orgnnic whole: economic modernisation. Japan's role ls 
primary In this process, compared with other countries. 
This explains why Peking touts 'Sino-Japanese friendship in 
the 21st century' as a major propaganda theme for internal 
as well as external audiences. Hu Yaobang's personal 
Identification with this theme, reciprocally endorsed by 
Prime Minister Yasu hiro Nakasone, gives it special signif-
icance as authorised as the highest level. 
Japan. provides the most difficult and dramatic test of 
dependence on a foreign source of trade, capital ·and 
technology, given Its stormy and at times bloody 
relationship with China over nearly seventy-five years. It 
is Impossible to bury the bitterness felt by many older 
generation mainlanders whose years of suffering and 
personal loss during the Japanese invasion continue to 
colour their feelings about reliance on a past enemy for 
future growth. Pointed and painful reminders of that 
experience appear in mainland media from time to time as 
express warnings 'against the possible return of Japanese 
mllltarism'. 35 
Yet on the whole the recent record ls relatively free 
from friction between these two entirely different economic 
and political systems. The most celebrated case of 
controversy, the Baoshan steel complex, came at a 
sufficiently early stage in the new relationship for the 
immediate bitter recriminations on both sides to serve as a 
valuable learning experience. Its renegotiation and gradual 
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realisation demonstrated a mutual willingness to compromise 
for the sake of the larger symbiotic interest. 36 
The Likely Ptospects 
The rapid. evqlutlon of post-Mao China from the 
Cultural Revolution turmoil of only a decade ago requires 
the constant updating of information with a consequent 
adjustment of perspective. But the trend has been 
consistent o.verall, despite momentary fluctuations end 
retreats. Den·g Xlaoplng's way has won out, time and 
again, despite ·all the odds and obstacles arraigned against 
ft, not the least of which was the extent to which It 
implicitly or explicitly reversed the course left by Mao 
Zedong as foundfng father of the PRC. 
To say .t.hat Deng's political shrewdness has been 
crucial Is ·not . to. predict that his achievement will disappear 
with his own . demise. On the contrary, Den g's careful 
fashioning of e coalition whose interest Iles in advancing 
and preserving his policy, given sufficient time to take root 
and solidify, ls a testimonial both to his survival tactics 
and his futur.e vision. Thus with each successive year of 
power he has added an indeterminable additional period of 
policy longevity, . ell other things being equal. 
Unfortunately other things seldom remain equal. First 
and foremost, .there are the economic consequences of 
Den g's policies that will remef n u ncertein for some time to 
come. If too m'uch is expected too soon, Impatient and 
exaggerated hopes can backlash on the leadership and be 
exploited by a·n opportunistic opposition. The sheer 
magnitude of the reforms, the scale of population end 
territory to be served, end the human obstacles of 
bureaucracy, backwardness end behaviour will bring 
setbacks of varying degree et one point or another. Some 
problems ere already visible; others will follow. Natural 
disasters, whether floods, earthquakes or typhoons, can 
wreak havoc with high-cost projects. The vicissitudes of 
the International economy will have an Increasing impact on 
Chine's Internal development with exports vulnerable to 
protectionism end imports to price nuctuetlons. 
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How and where the blame will fall under conditions of 
perceived shortfall or outright failure cannot be forecast 
with confidence. But foreign Involvement and c;'lependence 
will remain an Inviting scapegoat, justified or not~ This ls 
particularly true for Japan, and to a lesser extent the 
United States, assuming that the Taiwan problem remains 
unresolved. This backlash, In turn, can cause foreign 
investors to d·raw back or at least slow down the growth of 
their Involvement, thereby affecting the overall policy. 
Reference to Taiwan raises the potential linkage 
between foreign and domestic politics as they affect the 
'open door' policy. In 1983 . Deng Llqun, then head of the 
Propaganda -Department of the CCP, delivered a major 
address on 'patriotic education' which made patriotism, 
alguozhuyl, a virtual substitute for Marxism-Leninism in 
historical writings and teaching. 37 Although· 'there are 
some people In China who have, In fact, still not accepted 
commu nlsm, however with regard to patriotism, the majority 
of people, including those who have still not accepted 
communism, can have a common language ••• Therefore we 
can enlls.t support from a majority of the masses provided 
we proceed from patriotism.' This would lead 'from 
patriotism, to communism, the common road taken by all the 
advanced elements of modern China In the past and also a 
road for them to follow at present and In the future'. Thus 
the patriot of today will be the communist of tomorrow, 
according to Deng Llqun. 
D ut patriotism may be a passive affirmation of loyalty 
bonding a populace or It may be an active assertion of 
nationalism with binding obligations. The latter aspect ls of 
special Importance where foreign Insult or Injury enflames 
political passions or ls exploited toward that end. Deng 
Llqun specified, 'From now to the end of this century, the 
historical meaning of patriotism should be the three great 
tasks put forward by Comrade Deng Xlaoplng. Of the 
three great tasks, loving the motherland and socialism have 
a close and Inseparable relationship In socialist society. The 
u nlfication of the motherland ls still a pending task.' Thus 
the first two tasks exemplify passive affirmation while the 
third, Taiwan, poses an actionable goal. 
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Deng's directive to educators and scholars reflected 
the expression of assertive nationalism which surfaced In 
1982, in reaction ·to such provocations as Tokyo's proposed 
softening of textbook terminology for Japan's past 
aggressions, the defection of a celebrated tennis player to 
the United States, the controversy over American arms 
sales to Taiwa.n, and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's 
public discussion of Hong Kon g's future on · the basis of 
'three International treaties'. 38 
To be sure, these matters all were eventually resolved 
in one fashion or .another without serious injury to any of 
the external relationships. But the Immediate Chinese 
responses thereto revealed a possible threat to foreign 
dependence should similar matters arise In the future. Deng 
Xlaoping · put .ft bluntly to the Twelfth CCP Congress In 
September . 1982': 
Independence and self-reliance have always been 
and will forever be our basic stand. We Chinese 
people val.ue our friendship and co-operation with 
other countries and peoples. We value even more 
our hard-won independence and sovereign rights. 
No foreign country can expect China to be Its 
vassal or expect It to swallow an1 bitter fruit 
detrimental to Its own lnterests.~ 9 [Emphasis 
added] 
Hu Yaobang's asse.rtlon made the historical reference 
explicit: 'Having suffered aggression and oppression for 
over a century·, the Chinese people will never again allow 
themselves to be humiliated as before. 140 His words 
underscored Den g's response to a question on Hong Kong, 
'If I agree to prolong the lease, I will become the second LI 
Hongzhang. 141 
Such forceful declarations were not standard before 
1982, hearkening back Instead to postures struck at the 
Inception of the PRC when Mao asserted that the Chinese 
people had at last 'stood up!' The context within which 
Deng and Hu spoke illustrates how Issues such as Taiwan 
and Hong Kong can arouse nationalistic sensitivities which 
may either invite opposition to compromise or unite the 
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country on a patriotic basis with implicit or explicit anti-
foreign overtones. 
These domestic potentialities of alguozhuyl can have an 
Impact on dependence when a problem brings the two 
policies Into confrontation. Looking ahead, It ls possible to 
envisage a political crisis on Taiwan with the passing of 
Chiang Ching-kuo's rule, with or without action on behalf 
of Taiwan independence. Depending on circumstances et 
the time, Peking's avowed reediness to blockade the Island 
or to intervene forcibly would be tested against 
Washington's professed opposition to the use of force 
against Taiwan. 42 While the United States almost certainly 
would not respond militarily, economic sanctions could 
result, to the detriment of Sino-American trade and tech-
nology interaction. 
The Senkaku Islands (Dlaoyu Tai) are so miniscule In 
size and Importance as not to be worth including on any 
political or physical map. However, they symbolise the 
larger Sino-Japanese conflict of claims to the continental 
shelf with Its as yet unproven but presumed vast reserves 
of offshore oil. China has already protested against joint 
KoreAn-Japanese exploration of the area adjacent to the two 
countries as violating PRC sovereignty, although It has not 
followed up Its protests with action. Conceivably at some 
future time the question of either asserting Its claim or 
compromising It on the median line could confront Peking 
with e choice that in turn would affect Sino-Japanese 
economic co-operation. 
Less volatile, but nonetheless potentially provocative of 
nationalistic sensitivities, might be increased protectionist 
measures taken against Chinese exports to the United 
States. In 1983 acrimony over this question prompted 
Peking to violate its agreement for grain purchases, in 
addition suspending the Import of American soybeens end 
chemical fibres. Both sides managed to contain the 
controversy so as to permit summit visits to be exchanged 
in 1984. Nevertheless it Illustrated the impact trade 
disputes can have on the wider relationship. 
Of these three possible areas of contention, Taiwan 
remains the least predictable and most volatile, depending 
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as It does on what happens when Chiang dies. There ls no 
reason to think that the continental shelf, protectionism or 
other matters will become sufficiently serious In Peking 
politics to jeopardise the role of the United States or Japan 
In China's econ·omic modernisation so long as Deng ls alive 
and active. He has already addressed these Issues so as to 
prevail over whatever opposition existed, compromising or 
postponing them for the sake of the immediate priority: 
foreign participation and assistance in PRC growth and 
development. 
Whether his passing from power will make such tactics 
less successful could conceivably depend on whether Hu and 
Zhao co-operate or compete. A genuine duumvlrate of 
equals ls a rare and usually short-lived phenomenon In 
communist systems. It Is virtually unheard of In· Chinese 
history • . ~oth precedents augur poorly for Deng's two 
proteges to act In harmony once he leaves the scene. 
B4t this logic conflicts with the fact that both Hu and 
Zhao have had bitter experience with the perils of one-man 
rule. The memory of Mao may restrain that human ambition 
which universally motivates political figures to fight for the 
top position, particularly in an authoritarian system where 
the resultant power ls so disproportionate to that of all 
other Individuals. 
Even should friction or competition emerge between Hu 
and Zhao, It ls unlikely to renew the old debate between 
self-reliance and foreign dependence. Both men are deeply 
and publicly committed to Deng's policy In general, and Hu 
to Its Japanese component In particular. Neither could 
credibly criticise the present course as Ill-founded, much 
less as a betrayal of national or communist Interests. 
Without leadership at the very top, there ls little 
chance of a lesser figure or faction successfully exploiting 
the Issues to challenge a Hu-Zhao duumvlrate In combination 
with the coalition of vested Interests supporting foreign 
dependence. True, potential groundswell of reaction 
against the policy exists in the countryside and among 
conservative urban circles, all appalled at the degree to 
which 'un-Chlnese' and corrupt lifestyles permeate the 
coastal cities, especially among the youth. The 'socialist 
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pollution' campaign probably reflected widespread concern 
over practices associated with foreign Influences , a concern 
In consonance with much that Is traditional in Chinese 
culture. 
Indeed, seen In the broadest and longest perspective, 
the Deng-Hu-Zhao programme of foreign dependence may be 
rational but It Is not natural to China. The argument over 
national identity and independence versus foreign values 
and dependence Is a familiar one for newly developing 
nations. But It has deeper roots in the Middle Kingdom 
than in any other Third World country. 
This puts a premium on economic success, at le11st as 
measured In Incremental terms whereby present experience 
compareS' favourably with past memory, If not In cumulative 
terms compared with other societies. Rather than Mao's 
1958 slogan of 'overtake Britain In the production of steel', 
Deng's call to 'quadruple output by the year 2000' with an 
attendant · per capital annual Income of $1,000 ls safer 
poll tlcally, whatever Its feasibility. So long as life today ls 
better fhan yesterday, dissatisfaction can be contained 
within manageable limits. 
Certainly, as of 1985, Deng's programmes appear to 
float on a rising tide of public approval based on lmprov.lng 
standards of living, expanding employment, and opening 
opportunities for personal advancement. The distribution of 
profit and power ls unequal but sufficiently broad to win 
support across different economic sectors, geographic 
regions and social strata. While the dramatic rate of 
growth in 1980-85 cannot be expected to continue, nor 
indeed do the planners Intend It to, the likelihood of visible 
growth seems assured for at least the next five years and 
probably through the following decade. 
Admittedly, similar expectations were held by many In 
China and abroad thirty years ago. As against the 
economic and political chaos Inherited by the new regime In 
1949, by 1955 all doubt had disappeared from those of us 
who watched from Hong Kong and wondered how far, how 
fast would the economy grow. No speculation seemed sillier 
than the notion of India and China being in a race to 
provide the better model for emulation in what was then 
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termed the u nderdev:eloped world. It seemed obvious that 
there was no such race: China had already won. 
No one could foresee that Mao and his colleagues would 
experiment so radically and disastrously in the Great Leap 
Forward. Few couid anticipate Peking provoking Moscow to 
the point of total economic separation. And even Mao's 
closest comrades .:.. except for the Gang of Four - were 
caught by surprise at the full extent of his Cultural 
Revolution and the destruction it wreaked on the political 
and economic systems that had evolved over the previous 
two decades. 
These are sobering reminders that euphoric predictions 
of human behaviour in China, as elsewhere, are subject to 
the simple truism: human behaviour ls unpredictable. But 
forecasts are cast as probablllties and not made in absolute 
terms. Therefore· I conclude with a forecast: China's door 
will almost certainly remain open after the passing of Deng 
Xlaoplng, probably through the 1990s. Indeed, It ls likely 
to open wider with time. The present preoccu patlon with 
balancing tra~e annually should gradually give way to .large 
loans for imports that directly or indirectly facilitate 
repayment through future exports. 43 The gradual opening 
of cities throughout China for direct foreign Investment may 
result i·n. tt proliferation of multinational presence leaping 
over the traditional coastal enclaves. 44 Bolder visions may 
be realised, tying the PRC Into regional capital as w-ell as 
trade patterns that depend on the multilateral clearing of 
accounts. · 
Admittedly 'wo.rst case' scenarios can be devised to 
identify political and economic variables whose Interaction 
might arouse anti-foreign impulses and a return to self-
reliance. In any event there will be resistance to further 
opening the door where It threatens the Chinese sense of 
control over the allocation of values and resources. But In 
the final analysis, such concerns do not outweigh the 
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present stage it Is appropriate to maintain an unfavorable 
balance of trade within appropriate limits', arguing against 
standard practice. 
44. Bo Tao, 'On · "Northward" and "Southward" Strategy -
Initial Probing of .Developing China's Capital Cooperation 
with Foreign-_ Countries', Guangzhou yanjlu, fGuangzhou 
studies], No.1, 1985, in FBIS, 17 April 1985, K 8-14. Bo 
was In the Finance Research Office of the Head Office of 
the Rank of China. This detailed and sophisticated analysis 
attacked SEZs ·as too confining and limited, arguing Instead 
for 'boldly selllng part of our natural resources and market 
capacity to foreign Investors and letting the exclusively 
foreign-invested enterprises have an impact on the national 
Industry'. In addition, 'We must regard developing regional 
economic co-operation as our basic national policy ••• China 
can establish mechanisms for settling international accounts 
with Its trading partners (including multilateral and 
bilateral mechanisms) ••• In the Pacific rim region.' 
THE GEORGE ERNEST MORRISON 
LECTURE IN ETHNOLOGY 
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The George Ernest Morrison Lecture was founded by 
Chinese residents in Australia and others in honour of the 
late Dr G .E. Morrison, a native of Geelong, Victoria, 
Australia. 
The objects of the foundation of the lectureship were 
to honour for all time the memory of a great Australian who 
rendered valuable ·services to China, and . to improve 
cultural relations · between China and Australia. The 
foundation of the lectureship had the offic~al support of the 
Chinese Consulate-General and was due in particular to the 
efforts o( Mr William Liu, merchant, of Sydney; Mr William 
Ah Ket, barrister, of Melbourne; Mr F.J. Quinlan and 
Sir Colin MacKenz,le, of Canberra. From the time of its 
inception until 1948 the lecture was associated with the 
Australian . . Institute of Anatomy, but in the latter year the 
responsibility fo~ the management of the lectures.hip ·was 
taken over by the Australian National University, and the 
lectures delivered since that date have been given under 
the auspices of the University. 
The following lectures have been delivered: 
Inaugural: W.P. Chen, The Objects of the Foundation of 
the Lectureship and a reyiew of Dr Morrison's Life in 
China. 10 May 1932. 
Second: W. Ah Ket, Eastern Thought, with More Particular 
Reference to Confucius. 3 May 1933. 
Third: J.S. MacDonald, The History and DeYelopment of 
Chinese Art. 3 May 1934. 
Fourth: W.P. Chen, The New Culture Moyement In China. 
10 May 1935. 
Fifth: Wu Lien-teh, Reminiscences of George E. Morrisoni 
and Chinese Abroad. 2 September 1936.• 
Sixth: Chun-jien Pal, China Today: With Special 
Reference to Higher Education. 4 May 1937. • 
Seventh: A.F. Barker, The Impact of Western 
Industrialism on Chine. 17 Mey 1939. 
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Eighth: S.H. Roberts, The Gifts of the Old China to the 
New. 5 June 1939. 
Ninth: Howard Mowll, West China as Seen Through the 
Eyes of the Westerner. 29 May 1940. 
Tenth: W .G .• Goddard, The Ming Shen. A Study in 
Chinese Democracy. 5 June 1941. 
Eleventh: D. B". Copland, The Chinese Social Structure. 
27 September 1948. 
Twelfth: J. K. Rideout, Politics in Medlen! China. 
28 October 1949. 
Thirteenth: C. P. FltzOerald, The Revolutionary Tradition 
in China. · 19 March 1951. 
touPteentht 11·.v. Bvatt, llJom• A•p•ata of Morrl•on'I Life 
and Work. 4 December 1952. 
Fifteenth: Lord Lindsay of Blrker, China and the Weit. 
20 October 1953. 
Sixteenth: M. Titlev, Chinese Elements In Japanese 
Culture. 27 July 1954. 
Seventeenth: H. Bielenstein, Emperor Kuang-Wu 
(A.D.25-27) and the Northern Barbarians. 2 November 
1955.• 
Eighteenth: Leonard B. Cox, The Buddhist Temples of 
Yun-Kang and Lung-Men. 17 October 1956. 
Nineteenth: Otto P.N. Berkelbach van der Sprenkel, The 
Chinese Civil Service. 4 November 1957. 
Twentieth: A. R. Davies, The Narrow Lanes Some 
Observations on the Recluse In Traditional Chinese 
Society. 19 November 1958. 
Twenty-first: C. N. Spinks, The Khmer Temple of Prah 
Vlhar. 6 ·October 1959. 
Twenty-second: Chen Chlh-mai, Chinese La rid scape 
Paintings The Golden Age. 5 October 1960. 
Twenty-thirds L. Carrington Goodrich, China's Contacts 
with Other Parts of Asia In Ancient Times. 1 August 
1961.• 
Twenty-fourth: N. O. D. Malmqvist, Problems and Methods 
In Chinese Linguistics. 22 November 1962.• 
Twenty-fifth: H.F. Simon, Some Motivations of Chinese 
Foreign Polley. 3 October 1963. 
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Twenty-sixth: Wang Ling, Calendar, Cannon and Clock In 
the Cultural Relations between Europe and China. 
18 November 1964. 
Twenty-seventh: A.M. Halpern, Chinese Foreign Polley -
Success or Failure? 9 August 1966.• 
Twenty-eighth: J.W. de Jong, Buddha's Word In China. 
18 October 1967 .• 
Twenty-ninth: J. D. Frodsham, New Perspecthes in 
Chinese Literature. 23 July 1968.• 
Thirtieth: E.A. Huck, The Assimilation of the Chinese in 
Australia. 6 November 1969.• 
Thirty-first 1 < K ~A. Wittfogel, Agriculture• A Key to the 
Underl!ltandlng or Chin••• 11ool•t1, Paet and Pr•••nt. 
6 April 1970.• 
Thlrty-secor:id: I. de Rachewiltz, Prester John and 
Europe's Discovery or East Asia. 3 November 1971.* 
Thirty-thirds Eugene Kamenka, Marx, Marxism and China. 
6 September 1972. 
Thirty-fourth: Liu Ts'un-yan, On the Art of Ruling a Big 
Countrys Views of Three Chinese Emperors. 
13 November 1973.• 
Thirty-fifth: Jerome Ch'en, · Peasant Acthism In 
Contemporary China. 22 July 1974. 
Thirty-sixth: Yi-fu Tuan, Chinese Attitudes to Natures 
Idea and Reality. 3 September 1975. 
Thirty-seventh: Lo Hui-Min, The Tradition and Prototypes 
or the China-Watcher. 27 October 1976.• 
Thirty-eighth: Roy Hofheinz, People, Places and Political 
In Modern China. 17 August 1977. 
Thirty-ninth: Mark Elvin, Self-Liberation and Self-
Immolation In Modern Chinese Thought. 13 September 
1978.• 
Fortieth: Wang Gungwu, Power, Rights and Duties In 
Chinese History. 19 September 1979. • 
Forty-first: Dr Fang Chao-ying, The Great Wall or Chinas 
Keeping out or Keeping In? 5 June 1980. 
Forty-second: T'ien Ju-K'ang, Moslem Rebellion In Chinas 
A Yunnan Controversy. 17 June 1981.• 
Forty-third: Alan Thorne, China and Australlat Forty 
Thousand Years or Contact. 4 August 1982. 
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Forty-fourth: Chan Hok-lam, Control of Publishing in 
China, Past and Present. 24 August 1983.• 
Forty-fifth1 J.S. Gregory, The Chinese and Their 
Revolutions. 8 August 1984.• 
Forty-sixth: Allen S. Whiting, China and the Worlds 
Independence v Dependence. 31 July 1985.• 
• Available from Contemporary China Centre, Research 
School of Pacific Studies. 

